Input: profile with 6 voters and 16 candidates:
 voter 0:   {1, 2, 3, 4},
 voter 1:   {1, 2, 3, 5},
 voter 2:   {1, 2, 3, 6},
 voter 3:   {7, 8, 9},
 voter 4:   {10, 11, 12},
 voter 5:   {13, 14, 15}

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Proportional Approval Voting (PAV)
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Computing only one winning committee (resolute=True)

1 winning committee:
 {1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9}

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Phragmén's Sequential Rule (seq-Phragmén)
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1 winning committee:
 {1, 10, 11, 13, 14, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}

Results for PAV:
Pareto optimality                                  : True
Justified representation (JR)                      : True
Proportional justified representation (PJR)        : True
Extended justified representation (EJR)            : True
EJR+                                               : True
Full justified representation (FJR)                : False
Priceability                                       : False
Stable Priceability                                : False
The core                                           : False

Results for Sequential Phragmén:
Pareto optimality                                  : True
Justified representation (JR)                      : True
Proportional justified representation (PJR)        : True
Extended justified representation (EJR)            : True
EJR+                                               : True
Full justified representation (FJR)                : True
Priceability                                       : True
Stable Priceability                                : True
The core                                           : True

Sequential Phragmén satisfies priceability, PAV does not.
Sequential Phragmén satisfies the core property, PAV does not.
